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     Counsel for Appellees 
 
____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This is an appeal by three current or former employees 
of the Veterans Administration Medical Center ("VAMC") in 
Pittsburgh, who filed an action against VAMC administrators, 
claiming, among other things, that the administrators had 
violated the employees' First Amendment rights by retaliating 
against them for making statements intended to secure 
improvements for VAMC patients.  The employees sought injunctive 
and declaratory relief for these alleged constitutional 
violations but no damages.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants on these claims, holding that under 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the plaintiffs could not 
assert such claims in federal court but were instead required to 
pursue available administrative remedies.  Because Bush and the 
other Supreme Court decisions on which the defendants rely 
concern the recognition of non-statutory damages remedies rather 
than injunctive and declaratory relief, we reverse. 
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I. 
 The three appellants in this case are Kenneth L. 
Mitchum, previously Chief of Medical Services of the VAMC1; 
Deborah L. Webb, Assistant Chief Nurse for Special Projects; and 
Steven J. Krumholz, Staff Assistant to the Associate Director. 
All three appellants could have pursued administrative remedies 
to vindicate the alleged violations of their First Amendment 
rights.   
 Krumholz enjoyed the protection of the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. 95-454 (codified at various 
sections of Title 5 U.S.C.), and the Whistle-Blower Protection 
Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-12 (codified at various sections of 
Title 5 U.S.C.).  Under the CSRA, retaliation against a "whistle-
blower" is a prohibited personnel practice."  5 U.S.C. 
§2302(b)(8).  An allegation of a "prohibited personnel practice" 
may be submitted to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) of the 
Merit System Protection Board (MSPB).2  5 U.S.C. §§ 1212(a)(2), 
1214(a)(1)(A).  The OSC must investigate such an allegation and 
determine "whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists, or is to be 
taken."  5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(1)(A).  If the OSC determines that no 
                                                           
1Mitchum left the Veterans Administration before this appeal was 
argued, but he claims that he continues to be harmed by the 
presence in his personnel file of allegedly false and misleading 
statements concerning events at issue in this action.  He seeks 
the removal of these statements from his file.  All parties take 
the position that Mitchum's claims are not moot, and we agree. 
2Krumholz began to use these procedures by filing an 
administrative complaint, but his complaint was dismissed under 
29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(c) because the district court action had 
already been commenced and was still pending. 
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such grounds exist, the person who submitted the allegation must 
be notified.  5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(2)(A).  While the investigation 
continues, the OSC must periodically notify the person who made 
the allegation of its status.  5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(1)(C).  If the 
OSC determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the prohibited personnel action was or is to be taken, the OSC 
may petition a member of the MSPB for a stay and may recommend 
"corrective action" to the agency involved, the MSPB, and the 
Office of Personnel Management.  5 U.S.C. 
§1214(b)(1)(A)(i),(2)(B).  The OSC may also recommend 
disciplinary action against an employee who is reasonably 
believed to have committed a prohibited personnel practice.  5 
U.S.C. §1215(a)(1)(A). 
 Where the allegation submitted to the OSC concerns 
retaliation for whistle-blowing, review by the MSPB is always 
available.  If the OSC notifies the person making the allegation 
that the investigation has been terminated or if the OSC does not 
notify this person within 120 days that corrective action will be 
taken, the person may seek corrective action from the MSPB (5 
U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a)), and the MSPB may issue a stay and 
order "such corrective action as [it] considers appropriate."  5 
U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(A).  A final order or decision of the MSPB is 
subject to judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.  5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(h), 7703(b). 
 Mitchum and Webb were appointed to their positions 
under 38 U.S.C. §7401(1) and were subject to a different 
statutory scheme.  Under this scheme, the most extensive review 
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is available in a case involving a "major adverse action" based 
on "conduct or performance."  The term "major adverse action" is 
defined as including a suspension, transfer, reduction in grade 
or basic pay, or discharge.  38 U.S.C. § 7461(c)(2).  A question 
of professional conduct or competence is defined as a question 
involving "[d]irect patient care" or "[c]linical competence."  38 
U.S.C. § 7461(c)(3).  In a case concerning a "major adverse 
action" based on "conduct or performance" or in a so-called 
"mixed case" -- i.e., one involving both a "major adverse action" 
based on "conduct or performance" and other adverse actions (see 
38 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(3)) -- the appointee may appeal to a 
Disciplinary Review Board (DAB).  38 U.S.C. § 7462(a).  After the 
DAB renders a decision, the Secretary may, pursuant to that 
decision, "order reinstatement, award back pay, and provide such 
other remedies as the Board [finds] appropriate . . ., including 
expungement of records relating to the action."  38 U.S.C. 
§7462(d)(1).  An appointee adversely affected by a DAB decision, 
as reviewed by the Secretary, may obtain judicial review.  38 
U.S.C. § 7462(f)(1). 
 Grievances not involving a "major adverse action" based 
on "conduct or performance" or a "mixed case" proceed through 
internal VA administrative channels or those specified in an 
applicable collective bargaining agreement.  38 U.S.C. 
§§7461(b)(2), 7463.3 
                                                           
3Neither side in this case has expressly taken a position on the 
question whether the grievances of Mitchum and Webb could have 
been appealed to the DAB and reviewed by the Federal Circuit, and 
we express no view on this question. 
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 Instead of pursuing these remedies, the appellants 
filed an action in district court against the VAMC's director, 
chief of staff, associate director, chief of nursing service, and 
chief nurse, as well as the regional chief nurse of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.  The complaint contained five 
counts, but only the second is involved in this appeal. 
 Count II alleged that in 1991 Mitchum began to 
criticize the manner in which patients were treated at the VAMC. 
According to the complaint, Mitchum complained about efforts to 
close a unit of the facility, a general decline in patient care, 
the death of a patient in June 1992, patient nutrition, and the 
"warehousing" of psychiatric patients in the non-psychiatric 
unit.   
 Because of these criticisms, the complaint asserted, 
Mitchum's superiors took retaliatory measures against him. 
According to the complaint, Mitchum had received at least "highly 
satisfactory" evaluations in the years before 1992, but he 
received only a "satisfactory" rating in his 1991-92 performance 
review.  The complaint further alleged that he was given oral 
warnings concerning his performance and received a "Notice of 
Less Than Satisfactory Performance" in October 1992; that his 
superiors and other defendants acted in concert to inhibit his 
promotions and cause his resignation; and that his superiors 
removed him from his appointment to the Nutrition Support Team 
and his position as Acting Chief of the Rehabilitation Medicine 
Service.  Count II alleged that, at about the same time, Webb 
began to criticize the manner in which patients were treated and 
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was likewise targeted for retaliation.  According to the 
complaint, Webb had received promotions and outstanding 
performance evaluations until 1992, but in September 1992 she 
received a written "Counseling for Performance" and was 
subsequently demoted. 
 The complaint alleged that Krumholz had complained in 
September 1992 to the Department of Veterans Affairs Inspector 
General's office that his boss had committed plagiarism and that 
there had been an attempt to serve outdated food to patients. 
Although Krumholz had previously received excellent evaluations, 
the complaint alleged, he was subsequently given oral and written 
counsellings and was demoted. 
 Count II purported to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 and sought various forms of injunctive and declaratory 
relief, including an order directing the defendants to cease and 
desist from retaliation, harassment, and reprisal; an order 
directing the removal of certain documents from the plaintiffs' 
files; and an order directing the appointment of a permanent 
community-based board of overseers to monitor the operations of 
the facility.  Webb and Krumholz also sought reinstatement to 
their prior positions.   
 The defendants moved for dismissal or in the 
alternative for summary judgment, and the magistrate judge to 
whom this motion was referred recommended that it be granted. 
With respect to Count II, the magistrate judge first observed 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize a suit against federal 
officials.  Turning to the plaintiffs' argument that Count II 
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should be treated as asserting Bivens claims,4 the magistrate 
judge observed that in Bush the Supreme Court had declined to 
recognize a Bivens claim very similar to those asserted by the 
plaintiffs here.  In rendering that decision, the magistrate 
judge wrote, the Supreme Court "reasoned that Congress had set up 
an elaborate and carefully thought out system for civil servants 
to obtain review of employment decisions" and that the judiciary 
should not alter that system by recognizing "an additional 
damages claim against a supervisor for violation of First 
Amendment rights."   
 The magistrate judge found this same reasoning to be 
applicable here.  The magistrate judge noted that Krumholz, like 
the plaintiff in Bush, was subject to the CSRA, and that the 
remaining plaintiffs, as appointed Veterans Administration 
employees, had "an avenue of relief for adverse employment 
actions pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1)."  The magistrate judge 
stated that "[i]f a Bivens action is inappropriate when the CSRA 
applies to employment decisions, such action is equally 
inappropriate where Title 38 remedies apply."  The magistrate 
judge acknowledged that the "Supreme Court in Bush addressed only 
the issue of a damages remedy, and not a request for injunctive 
relief."  However, the magistrate judge continued: 
The rationale of Bush . . . is equally 
applicable to injunctive relief as to money 
damages.  The Supreme Court was convinced 
that Congress had given careful thought to 
the extent and nature of remedies that ought 
to be made available to federal employees in 
                                                           
4See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
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situations involving adverse employment 
decisions.  Any extension of those remedies, 
whether involving damages or injunctive 
relief, ought to originate in Congress, and 
not the courts. 
 
 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
opinion and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on Count II.  The court ordered the dismissal of some of the 
other counts and entered summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on all of the remaining counts.  This appeal followed. 
  
II.  
 In Bush, a federal employee asserted a First Amendment 
claim that was quite similar in all respects but one to the claim 
of the appellants in this case.  In Bush, the employee contended 
that he had been suspended in retaliation for whistle-blowing, 
and although he had been restored to his prior position with 
backpay as a result of administrative proceedings, he sought to 
obtain damages and attorney's fees in a Bivens action.  462 U.S. 
at 369-72 & nn. 8 and 9.  The Supreme Court, however, declined to 
create the "new judicial remedy" that he sought.  Id. at 368. The 
Court noted that a Bivens action could be defeated where there 
are "`special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.'"  Id. at 377 (quoting Bivens, 
403 U.S. at 396), and the Court found such a factor in the 
"comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions" of the 
CSRA.  Id. at 368.  The Court noted that this "elaborate remedial 
system" had been "constructed step by step, with careful 
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attention to conflicting policy considerations."  Id. at 388. The 
Court observed that the risk of personal liability could deter 
supervisors from imposing discipline and that Congress was in "a 
far better position that a court to evaluate the impact of a new 
species of litigation between federal employees or the efficiency 
of the civil service."  Id. at 389.  The Court thus declined "to 
create a new substantive legal liability without legislative 
aid[.]'"  Id. at 390 (citation omitted).   
 Two years later, in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 
439 (1988), the Court pointed to the comprehensive nature of the 
CSRA in holding that a federal employee could not seek backpay 
under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, even though such claim 
had won judicial recognition prior to the CSRA.  Later the same 
term, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), the Court 
relied on Bush in refusing to recognize a non-statutory damages 
claim for the unconstitutional denial of Social Security 
disability benefits.  The Court observed that "[w]hen the design 
of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what 
it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional 
violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we 
have not created additional Bivens remedies."  Id. at 423.   
 Based on these decisions -- and in particular on Bush -
- a good argument can be made that a federal employee who has 
meaningful administrative remedies and a right to judicial review 
under the CSRA or another comparable statutory scheme should not 
be permitted to bypass that scheme by bringing an action under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. 
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Several courts of appeals have so held, and these decisions have 
much to recommend them.  See, e.g., Saul v. United States, 928 
F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991); Stephens v. Dep't of Health and 
Human Services, 901 F.2d 1571, 1575-77 (11th Cir. 1990); Lombardi 
v. Small Business Administration, 889 F.2d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 
1989).5   
 The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has reached 
the opposite conclusion.  In Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986), an unsuccessful applicant for a position as a 
criminal investigator with the Environmental Protection Agency 
claimed that he had been rejected because he had previously 
engaged in communications with the press that were protected by 
the First Amendment.  The panel that initially heard the appeal 
held that Bush defeated the applicant's Bivens claim for damages 
but permitted him to seek the equitable remedy of reinstatement. 
Id. at 11.  The panel wrote: 
 "[There is a] presumed availability of 
federal equitable relief against threatened 
invasions of constitutional interests." 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404, 91 S. Ct. at 2008 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  See also Mount 
Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S. Ct. 568, 574-75, 50 
L.Ed.2d  471 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 
15, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 
(1971).  In particular, this Circuit has 
recognized the right of a federal job 
applicant to seek injunctive relief from an 
agency's violation of his constitutional 
rights in general . .  . and his first 
amendment rights in particular. . . . 
                                                           
5See also Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 528 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(reserving decision); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(no claim for injunctive relief for "minor" personnel action). 
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Id. (footnote & citations omitted).  In a footnote, the panel 
explained: 
 Allowing federal employees and 
applicants to seek equitable relief in 
federal courts for allegedly unconstitutional 
personnel actions suggests an "end-run" 
problem. . . . 
 
 Yet the rule in this Circuit, which has 
been repeatedly applied, is clearly 
different: CSRA does not preclude federal 
employees form seeking equitable relief 
against agencies for allegedly 
unconstitutional personnel actions. . . . 
 
 The courts' power to impose equitable 
remedies against agencies is broader than its 
power to impose legal remedies against 
individuals.  Bivens actions are a recent 
judicial creation and . . . comparatively 
easy for Congress to preempt.  The court's 
power to enjoin unconstitutional acts by the 
government, however, is inherent in the 
Constitution itself, see Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed.60 (1803). 
Although Congress may limit this power, see 
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 19 
L.Ed. 264 (1869), CSRA did not explicitly 
limit our jurisdiction to enjoin 
unconstitutional personnel actions by federal 
agencies. 
 
Id. at 11 n.15. 
 
 The portion of the panel decision concerning the claim 
for damages was reheard en banc and reaffirmed by the full court. 
Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Although the 
en banc court did not rehear the issue of the claim for 
reinstatement, it commented: 
[W]e do not suggest that CSRA precludes the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction over the 
constitutional claims of federal employees 
and job applicants altogether. . . .  On the 
13 
contrary, time and again this court has 
affirmed the right of civil servants to seek 
equitable relief against their supervisors, 
and the agency itself, in vindication of 
their constitutional rights.  See, e.g. 
Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir. 
1986). . . . 
 
Id. at 229 (footnote and citations omitted). On balance, we think 
that the District of Columbia Circuit has taken the better 
course.  The power of the federal courts to grant equitable 
relief for constitutional violations has long been established. 
See, e.g., Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 838-46, 
859 (1824); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908).  Thus, as 
the District of Columbia Circuit observed, there is a "`presumed 
availability of federal equitable relief against threatened 
invasions of constitutional interests.'"  Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 
(quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment)).  It is reasonable to assume that Congress legislates 
with the understanding that this form of judicial relief is 
generally available to protect constitutional rights.  While 
Congress may restrict the availability of injunctive relief (see, 
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 2283; 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)), we believe 
that we should be very hesitant before concluding that Congress 
has impliedly imposed such a restriction on the authority to 
award injunctive relief to vindicate constitutional rights. 
 It is true that Bush found that the history and 
structure of the CSRA spoke with sufficient clarity to preclude 
the creation of a new Bivens claim.  But the Supreme Court has 
developed a special jurisprudence for Bivens claims, and we are 
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hesitant to extend this jurisprudence into other spheres.  Just 
because "special factors counselling hesitation" militate against 
the creation of a new non-statutory damages remedy, it does not 
necessarily follow that the long-recognized availability of 
injunctive relief should be restricted as well.  We assume that 
the power of the federal courts to award legal and equitable 
relief in actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 stems from the same 
source, see Bush, 462 U.S. at 374, but that does not mean that 
the factors that counsel against one type of relief are equally 
applicable with respect to the other.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 
405-06 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); Dellinger, Of 
Rights and Remedies:  The Constitution As A Sword, 85 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1532, 1543 (1972). 
 As we have noted, a good argument can be made that the 
reasoning of Bush should be applied to cases involving only 
injunctive relief, but this application involves a big and 
important jump.  Without more specific guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we do not think that this is a jump that we should make. 
We therefore hold that Bush and the related Supreme Court 
decisions on which the defendants rely did not prevent the 
district court from entertaining the appellants' requests for 
injunctive relief.  Nor do we interpret these precedents as 
limiting the district court's authority to award declaratory 
relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.6   
  
                                                           
6We do not reach the question whether such relief would be 
inappropriate for any other reason. 
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III. 
 For these reasons, the order of the district court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
